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Detective Cottam ac t in good f a i th by re lying on the search 
warrant , therefore , warranting a denial of defendant 's motion to 
suppress pursuant t o the United S ta tes Supreme Court 's decision 
in Uniteq States v. Leon? 
3 . Whether the evidence presented a t t r i a l was 
su f f i c i en t to support the j u r y ' s finding tha t the value of the 
r ing exceeded $1,000? 
4. Whether a l legedly improper comments made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument cons t i tu ted r eve r s ib le e r ror? 
5 . Whether the t r i a l judge properly denied defendant 's 
motion to suppress defendant 's prior conviction for perjury? 
6. If t h i s Court reverses defendant 's conviction in 
t h i s case based on execution of an i l l e g a l search warrant, 
whether a concurrent reversal in Case No. 19990 i s necessary or 
j u s t i f i e d ? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RUSSELL G. SLCWE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20070 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Russell G. Slowe, Sr., was charged with 
attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of attempted theft, in a jury 
trial held May 31, 1984 and June 1, 1984, in the Second Judicial 
District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Cornaby on June 20, 1984, to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison. The sentence was stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation with the condition that he 
serve six months in the Weber County Jail and that he comply with 
any other terms imposed by the Adult Probation Department. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On December 15, 1983, Jeff Cottam, a detective with the 
Ogden City Police Department, led a team of officers as they 
conducted a "reverse sting" operation at Crazy Horse Jewelers, 
defendant's business (R. 279, 284). The operation was set up to 
allow defendant the opportunity to purchase an item from John 
Gallegos, a police informant after being told that the item was 
stolen (R. 286, 289). 
Approximately 1 1/2 hours before the operation took 
place, Detective Cottam conducted a meeting with all the 
necessary people involved and assigned duties to each individual 
(R. 287-288). At this meeting Mr. Gallegos was outfitted with a 
radio transmitter and a microcassette recorder in an effort to 
monitor the meeting with defendant (R. 289-90). Before entering 
defendant's business, Mr. Gallegos was searched, given a diamond 
ring to sell, and instructed how to conduct the transaction (R. 
289-91). Detectives Cottam and Greiner took a postion across the 
street from defendant's business in an undercover surveillance 
van (R. 193-94). Detectives Hall and Garrett positioned 
themselves near defendant's business on the same side of the 
street (R. 194) . Detective Shorten was in the Narcotics Bureau 
Office monitoring the transaction over the radio transmitter 
(R. 194). 
Once everyone was in position, Mr. Gallegos entered 
Crazy Horse Jewelers, showed defendant the ring and asked him if 
he would like to do some business (R. 412). Defendant asked Mr. 
Gallegos where he got the ring and Mr. Gallegos replied that he 
had committed a burglary in Roy and he had to get rid of the ring 
fast (R. 412). Defendant asked Mr. Gallegos what he would take 
for it and Mr. Gallegos requested Fifty Dollars (R. 412). 
Defendant Offered him Forty Dollars and Mr. Gallegos accepted 
(R. 412-13). (See Appendix A for transcript of conversation). 
Mr. Gallegos exited the store after giving defendant the ring in 
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exchange for two Twenty Dollar bills (R. 203-413). Once outside, 
Mr. Gallegos notified the officers by means of a pre-arranged 
hand signal that the sale had occurred as planned (R. 293, 413). 
Mr. Gallegos then walked over to Detective Cottam, handed him the 
tape recorder, and informed him that the transaction had occurred 
as discussed (R. 293, 413). At that time, Mr. Gallegos gave 
Forty Dollars to Detective Shorten and the detective searched him 
(R. 294, 413). 
Detective Cottam immediately took the supporting 
affidavit and the search warrant, which had been preprepared, to 
Judge Ziegler to be signed (R. 294) • It was a necessary and com-
mon occurrence to have both the affidavit and the search warrant 
prepared prior to the transaction because of the ease in which 
property, particularly an item as small as a ring, can be dis-
posed of or hidden in a place where the police could not locate 
it (R. 285-86). Detective Cottam swore to the contents of the 
affidavit and Judge Ziegler signed both the affidavit and the 
search warrant (R. 294). 
Detective Cottam, with the assistance of several 
officers, executed the search warrant in defendant's presence at 
Crazy Horse Jewelers (R. 294-95). After about an hour, defendant 
removed the ring from his pocket and turned it over to Detective 
Cottam (R. 297-98)• At that point, the search was terminated and 
defendant was placed under arrest (R. 298). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
Detective Cottam, the affiant, provided sufficient 
underlying facts and circumstances in the affidavit supporting 
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the search warrant to support Judge Z i e r g l e r ' s finding of 
probable cause. The aff iant also supplied su f f i c ien t evidence to 
support a finding t ha t Mr. Gallegos, the police agent r was 
c redib le and the information he provided was r e l i a b l e . If, 
however, t h i s Court finds t h a t the fac t s in the a f f idavi t were 
in su f f i c i en t to support the issuance of a search warrant , the 
evidence seized by Detective Cottam should not be suppressed 
because the police of f icers acted in an object ively reasonable 
manner. 
The evidence presented a t t r i a l was unquestionably 
su f f i c i en t to support the j u r y ' s conclusion tha t the value of the 
r ing exceeded $1,000. 
Remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument 
re fe r r ing to defendant as a "fence", although probably improper, 
did not r i s e to the level of revers ib le e r ro r . There was no 
evidence tha t the jury was influenced by the remarks. 
The t r i a l judge properly denied defendant 's motion to 
suppress evidence of a prior perjury convict ion. Although the 
conviction was more than 10 years old, the nature of the crime 
and the circumstances of the present case necess i ta ted the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s ru l ing t h a t a prior perjury conviction i s admissible to 
challenge defendant 's c r e d i b i l i t y as a wi tness . 
F ina l ly , if t h i s court reverses defendant 's conviction 
in the present case, i t does not follow, as defendant a l l eges , 
tha t a reversal of defendant ' s conviction in Case No. 19990 i s 
required. Defendant fa i led to r a i se the issue in the t r i a l court 
in Case No. 19990 and i s therefore foreclosed from ra is ing i t for 
the f i r s t time on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS ISSUED WAS SUFFICIENTLY 
COMPLETE TO SUPPORT JUDGE ZIEGLER'S 
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSEf THEREFORE, 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE 
WARRANT SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
Defendant complied with requirements under State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983)f in this case by objecting to the 
introduction of evidence at trial, therefore preserving the issue 
for appeal. Defendant claims that the affidavit contains 
material misstatements of fact which cannot support the issuance 
of a search warrant. Specifically, defendant contends that the 
statement in the affidavit that "Slowe was told by John Gallegos 
that the ring was stolen and that he needed some quick cash" was 
factually erroneous. Although Mr. Gallegos did not use that 
specific language, the meaning of what he said was unmistakenly 
the same. According to the recorded transmission of the 
transaction, Mr. Gallegos said he got the ring . . . " off of a 
burglary and I just wanna get rid of it. . . . I don't care how 
much you wanna give me for it. I gotta get rid of it." (Ji££ 
Appendix A). Although the words "stolen" and "quick cash" were 
not used, the minor differences between what was actually said 
and what was stated by Detective Cottam in the affidvait are 
merely technical. The only possible interpretation of each 
statement is that Mr. Gallegos was offering to sell defendant a 
stolen ring. 
It is well established that when determining whether 
probable cause exists, we deal with probabilities which are not 
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technical, but are merely the factual and practical considera-
tions of everyday life upon which reasonable men act. Illinois 
v. Gates, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 1218 (1983). The 
language used in the affidavit is not nearly as important as the 
accuracy of what transpired. Detective Cottam1s statement of 
what occurred is, in essence, accurate and therefore, suppression 
of evidence based on a technical discrepancy in the specific 
words used is unjustified. 
Defendant also claims that the statement on the 
affidavit that "ttlhese acts were recorded on tape and observed 
by affiant and other police officers nearby" was "completely 
without foundation." However, Detective Cottam headed the opera-
tion and assigned particular duties to Mr. Gallegos and the other 
officers involved. Mr. Gallegos was outfitted with both a radio 
transmitter and a microcassette recorder. The transmitter and 
recorder were tested several times prior to the conversation with 
defendant (R. 307). The affiant observed Mr. Gallegos enter and 
exit defendant's business and heard segments of the conversation 
between defendant and Mr. Gallegos. Furthermore, the affiant's 
observations and conclusions were supported by Mr. Gallegos1s 
statement that the sale had progressed as planned. Thus, 
Detective Cottam1s statement that the transaction was recorded 
and the circumstances were observed by police officers were 
reasonable conclusions based on the degree of preparation and the 
fact that the transaction had proceeded as planned. 
Similarly, defendant claims that the corroborative 
statement that "police officers recorded the conversation by use 
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of a tape recorder and had constant view of the store and on-
sight view of our informant" also lacks foundation. Howeverf for 
the same reasons as stated above, the affiant's corroborative 
statement is a reasonable conclusion based on the extensive 
preparation his observations, what he heard of the conversation 
over the van radio, and Mr. Gallegosfs statement that the 
transaction went according to plan. 
Defendant further alleges that the affidavit contains a 
material conclusion improperly considered in a probable cause 
determination. The affidavit states that defendant "purchased 
the ringf believing it was stolen. . . . " Defendant correctly 
asserts that the statement constitutes a conclusion however, it 
is a reasonable conclusion based on what affiant heard Mr. 
Gallegos say to defendant. Detective Cottam heard Mr. Gallegos 
greet defendant and tell him he had a stolen ring he would like 
to show him (R. 196). Based upon this personal knowledge and Mr. 
Gallegos's statement that the sale proceeded as planned, the 
conclusion that defendant purchased the ring believing it to be 
stolen was reasonable. 
This Court has stated that an affidavit "need not 
reflect the direct personal observation of the affiant, so long 
as the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying 
circumstances supporting the conclusions." State v. JordanF 665 
P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983). The State recognizes that facts 
enumerated in the affidavit may not be wholly conclusory, 
however, Detective Cottam substantially informed Judge Ziegler of 
the details of the transaction and the fact that the police were 
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monitoring the transaction as closely as possible both visually 
and through radio transmission. Thus, the affiant's conclusion 
was supported by evidence and properly included in the affidavit. 
Finally, defendant contends that the alleged 
infirmities of the affidavit render it insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause. The standard by which probable cause 
for the issuance of a search warrant is measured is merely "the 
probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." 
State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983). 
The affidavit in this case meets and exceeds this 
standard. The police agent was searched and wired prior to the 
transaction, given instructions to inform defendant that the ring 
was stolen, answered affirmatively when asked if the sale went as 
planned, turned over Forty Dollars received from defendant, and 
was searched again after the sale was completed. The affiant 
observed the police agent enter and exit defendant's business, 
heard part of the conversation in which Mr. Gallegos told 
defendant that the ring was stolen, asked Mr. Gallegos if the 
sale went as planned and observed Gallegos turn over Forty 
Dollars received from defendant to another officer. These 
circumstances unquestionably support a finding of a "probability 
of criminal activity." 
Judge Ziegler made a finding of probable cause and 
issued a warrant. It is well established that this Court accords 
great deference to a magistrate's determination of proba.ble 
cause. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1286. JSJ££ also Spinelli v. United 
££&l£J5, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969), and State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 
715, 719 (Utah 1983). 
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Because the facts and underlying circumstances included 
in the affidavit were substantially accurate and Judge Ziegler 
made a finding of probable cause, the search warrant was valid. 
Consequently, the evidence seized should not be suppressed 
because of minor technical differences between the language used 
by Gallegos and that contained in the affidavit. 
Defendant also claims that the affidavit failed to show 
underlying facts and circumstances to establish the credibility 
of the police agent. The affiant stated that "Gallegos has 
assisted police officers on prior occasions, resulting in the 
clearance of more than 25 burglaries, and several felony arrests 
and convictions." The applicable standard for establishing 
informant credibility is the "totality of the circumstances." 
Illinois v. Gates. 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). The Court stated 
that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the 'veracity1 and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Xd. 
Defendant claims that the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test may 
still be viable in this Court, citing State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 
1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). That case held that the Aguilar-Spinelli 
test may be necessary as a guideline in some cases unless the 
circumstances as a whole indicate that the informant's rejport is 
truthful. Id. at 1205-06. 
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The State contends that under either test, the 
underlying facts and circumstances stated in the affidavit show a 
basis for the police agentfs veracity and reliability. The fact 
that Mr. Gallegos was outfitted with a radio transmitter and a 
microcassette recorder establish the truthfulness of his report. 
Mr. Gallegos1s past relationship as a police agent resulting in 
the clearance of numerous burglaries and several arrests and 
convictions support the reliability of the agent's information. 
This Court held that an affidavit which stated that "the 
informant has proven reliable in the past, assisting this 
department in numerous narcotic operations now pending 
prosecution" complied with the Aguilar-Spinelli test. JLiiiLdailf 
665 P.2d at 1286. In the present caef the affiant1 s basis for 
his knowledge was set out in detail and specific underlying facts 
were asserted to demonstrate reliability, i.e., that prior 
assistance had resulted in clearance of 25 burglaries and several 
felony arrests and convictions. In any event, this Court held 
that an implicit conclusion of an affiant that an informant is 
credible and his information reliable is sufficient. State v. 
£om£JLer 660 P.2d 715, 719 and n. 5 (Utah 1983). 
Applying this Court's reasoning to the present case, 
Detective Cottam went beyond the bare minimum requirements to 
establish Mr. Gallegos1s credibility and the reliabilty of his 
information. Prior successful operations, the fact that Mr. 
Gallegos was wired and carrying a tape recorder, and that he was 
under constant observation of police officers establish his 
veracity and the reliability of the information he provided. 
-10-
POINT II 
DETECTIVE COTTAM PREPARED THE AFFIDAVIT 
AND EXECUTED THE SEARCH WARRANT IN GOOD 
FAITH, THEREFORE, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT 
MINOR TECHNICAL DISCREPANCIES EXIST IN 
THE AFFIDAVIT, THEY SHOULD NOT JUSTIFY 
SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED. 
Defendant claims that evidence seized pursuant to the 
search warrant should be suppressed because the affidavit set 
forth facts allegedly insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause. Assuming arguendo that the affidavit lacked 
underlying facts and circumstances sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause, it does not necessarily follow that 
the evidence seized should be suppressed. The United States 
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant 
is, in general, not to be excluded. United States v. Leon. 
U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420 (1984). Suppression of evidence 
remains an appropriate remedy in four exceptional situations: 
(1) if the magistrate or judge issuing the warant was misled by 
information in the affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of 
the truth; (2) if the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role; (3) if the officer relied on a warrant based on an 
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) if the 
warrant is "so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to b'e 
seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it 
to be valid." Id. at 3421-22. The Court further stated that, 
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"other objections to the modification of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule we consider to be insubstantial." Id. 
When this standard is applied to the present case, 
there is no evidence and defendant does not claim that the 
issuing magistrate abandoned his judicial role or that the 
warrant was so facially deficient that it could not be reasonably 
relied upon by the executing officers. Although not specifically 
addressed by defendant, the only possible arguments would be 
that; (1) the issuing magistrate was misled by information in the 
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was 
false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; or (2) the 
officer relied on a warrant so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render reliance unreasonable. 
In the instant case, there were no "false" statements 
in the affidavit. The only discrepancies were technical 
differences between the language actually used and that asserted 
in the affidavit. Looked at in a common-sense manner, the 
meaning of what was said and the meaning of what was asserted in 
the affidavit are not subject to different interpretations. 
Moreover, the conclusions of the affiant that defendant purchased 
the ring, believing it to be stolen and that the conversation was 
being recorded were reasonable and well supported by underlying 
facts and circumstances. Thus, Judge Ziegler was not misled by 
incaccurate information in the affidavit and properly found 
sufficient grounds for issuance of a search warrant. 
Addressing the second possible argument, Detective 
Cottam relied on a warrant which was sufficiently supported by 
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underlying facts and circumstances and a neutral magistrate's 
determination of probable cause, Thereforef for reasons stated 
above, the affiant's reliance on the search warrant was 
reasonable. Detective Cottam acted in objective good faith and 
his transgressions, if any, were very minor, therefore, the 
magnitude of the benefit conferred on a guilty defendant by 
suppressing evidence would offend the basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system. Lesmr 104 S.Ct. at 3413. 
In a case very similar to the present one, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that even though the search warrant 
was invalid because the affidavit containined inaccuracies and 
did not include certain facts necessary to establish probable 
cause, evidence seized could not be suppressed because the 
officers acted in an objectively reasonable fashion. United 
States v. Sager. 743 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (8th Cir. 1984), cert, 
denied 105 S.Ct. 1196 (1985). Applying the Eighth Circuit's 
reasoning to the present case, even if the affidavit was 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the evidence 
seized should not be suppressed because the officers acted in an 
objectively reasonable fashion. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED 
UNDER UTAH LAW BECAUSE THE ALLEGED 
VIOLATION WAS NOT "SUBSTANTIAL" AND 
DETECTIVE COTTAM ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
The Utah good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
is consistent with the "objective good faith" standard 
established in h&sm, 104 S.Ct. at 3413. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
12(g) (1982) provides in pertinent part: 
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(g)(1) In any motion concerning the 
admissibility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trialf upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to he both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. • • . 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer 
was acting in good faith under this section, 
the court shall considerf in addition to any 
other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following; 
(i) The extent of the deviation from 
legal search and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will 
tend to deter future violations of search and 
seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of search warrant, arrest 
warrant, or relying upon previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was 
invaded. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Legislature has therefore set forth a two-
prong test which must be satisfied before suppression of the 
evidence may properly be ordered by the Court. Under the first 
prongf the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the 
violation was "substantial." A substantial violation is defined 
by § 77-23-12 which provides: 
Pursuant to the standards described 
in section 77-35-12(g) property or 
evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant shall not be suppressed at a 
motion, trial or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace officer 
is shown to be substantial. Any unlawful 
search or seizure shall be considered 
substantial and in bad faith if the 
warrant was obtained with malicious purpose 
and without probable cause or was executed 
maliciously and willfully beyond the 
authority of the warrant or with unnecessary 
severity. [Emphasis added]. 
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Detective Cottam included in the affidavit facts based 
on personal knowledge and information received from a credible 
police agent. The facts were considered sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate. Defendant 
failed to offer any evidence that the search warrant was "obtained 
with malicious purpose." Thereforef because an unlawful search 
must be "substantial and in bad faith" to warrant suppression of 
evidence, the lower court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence. 
POINT IV 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL REGARDING 
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY RECEIVED BY 
DEFENDANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Defendant was convicted of attempted theft pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 and 76-6-412r a third degree felony 
when the value of the property exceeds $1,000. Defendant contends 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter 
of law to prove the value of the stolen property. This assertion 
is competely without merit. 
It is well established in Utah that the standard of 
review on appeal of the sufficiency of evidence is that: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
State v. Clark, 675 P.2d 557, 562 (Utah 1983). 
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This Court has held t h a t value of property for purposes 
of § 76-6-412 i s determined by i t s market va lue; tha t i s , the 
pr ice a well-informed buyer would pay a well-informed s e l l e r where 
nei ther i s obliged to enter in to the t r ansac t ion . S ta te v. Logan, 
563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977). 
The prosecut ion 1s wi tness , Richard West, owns West 
Jewelers in Ogden and has been involved in the jewelry business 
for 38 years (R. 385). He has been a c e r t i f i e d gemologist for 32 
years and i s current ly one of only six in the s t a t e of Utah. When 
asked if he was famil iar with the used jewelry market, Mr. West 
s t a t ed : 
Yes. In the process of business , we are 
ca l led upon many, many times to offer t r ade - in 
allowance for people on t h e i r diamond rings to 
apply to other purchases of diamond r ings . 
Jus t the fact t ha t you are appraising for 
insurance purposes as well as e s t a t e purposes, 
those are a l l used pieces of merchandise for 
tha t purpose. . . . 
Now, if they go out on the market to buy 
i t , then you go back to your or iginal—or to 
s e l l i t , you go back to your or ig inal de f in i -
t ion where they are defined as a wi l l ing 
buyer and are wi l l i ng , therefore , to s e l l i t 
a t t he i r agreement. I have a l o t of people 
come in asking for an appraisa l for tha t 
purpose because they want to s e l l t he i r 
diamonds. This appraisa l wi l l give them an 
estimated replacement value from which they 
can work or bargain with someone to s e l l . 
(R. 393-94). 
When Mr* West was asked t o s t a t e h i s appraisal defense counsel 
objected, claiming tha t Mr. West was not qua l i f i ed to est imate the 
value of used jewelry in Weber County. Judge Cornaby overruled 
the object ion, s t a t i n g ; "There1s no question but what he under-
stands the used market in Weber County" (R. 395). Based on a 
de ta i l ed appra i sa l , Mr. West estimated the value at $2,878.00 
(R. 395-99). 
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Defense counsel called two witnesses to estimate the 
value of the ring. The first, Dennis Bryson, manufactures and 
sells primarily Indian jewelry out of his home. Mr. Bryson 
testified that he had not done a great deal with diamonds and gold 
(R. 351). Based on a rough description of the size of the 
diamonds and visual inspection with the naked eyef Mr. Bryson 
estimated the value between Seven Hundred and Eight Hundred 
Dollars. 
Under similar circumstances, the second defense 
witness. Jack Tittensor, estimated the value of the ring between 
Six Hundred Fifty and Twelve Hundred Dollars. Mr. Tittensor is a 
benchman, a person who constructs pieces of jewelry. His estimate 
is based on what his boss might give on a trade-in (R. 381). 
The jury instruction given on the issue of value was 
that: 
When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by theft must be determined, the 
market value at the time and in the locality 
of the theft shall be the test. That value 
is the highest price, estimated in terms of 
money, for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at the time and in that 
locality, if the owner was desirous of 
selling, but under no urgent necessity of so 
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable 
time within which to find a purchaser, and 
the buyer had knowledge of the character of 
the property and of the uses to which it 
might be put. (R. 76). 
Using the jury instruction as a guide, the jury reasonably 
determined from the evidence presented that the value of the ring 
exceeded $1,000. Therefore, by viewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, this Court 
should affirm the jury's findings on the issue of value. 
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POINT V 
ALLEGEDLY INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS MADE 
BY THE PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Defendant claims t ha t the reference by the prosecutor 
duing closing argument that defendant was a "fence" or the kind of 
person who has received s to len property requires t ha t defendant 's 
conviction be se t a s ide . However, a presumption i s raised under 
§ 76-6-408(2)(b) t h a t defendant had the r equ i s i t e knowledge or 
bel ief if he had received other s tolen property within the year 
preceeding t h i s offense. Defendants prior conviction for 
receiving s tolen property had been received in to evidence and the 
prosecutor was merely drawing the j u r y ' s a t t en t i on to tha t 
conviction and the presumption i t r a i ses when he used the "fence" 
labe l to describe defendant 's a c t i v i t i e s . 
Although the prosecutor improperly used the word 
"fence" in re fe r r ing to defendant during closing argument, such an 
error does not warrant r eve r sa l . The standard for determining 
whether a p rosecu to r ' s comments warrant reversal i s measured by a 
two-pronged ana lys i s : (1) did the remarks c a l l the a t t en t ion of 
the ju ro r s to matters they would not be j u s t i f i e d in considering 
in reaching the i r v e r d i c t ; and (2) were the j u r o r s , under the 
circumstances of the pa r t i cu l a r case, probably influenced by the 
remarks? Sta te v. Smith. (Utah Case No. 18839), decided May 10, 
1985). In SioiUlf t h i s Court held t h a t the p rosecu tor ' s comments, 
suggesting the jury had an obl igat ion beyond fac t - f ind ing , met the 
f i r s t half of the t e s t , but did not influence the decision of the 
ju ry . Xd. The Court ' s decision was based on considerat ion of a l l 
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the circumstances of the casef including the nature and extent of 
the evidence indicating defendant's guilt. Xd. 
In the present case, the entire weight of evidence 
points to the guilt of defendant. The police agent offered 
defendant the opportunity to purchase a stolen ring. Defendant 
paid Mr. Gallegos Forty Dollarsf a price considerably below the 
ring's fair market value. The ring was recovered by Detective 
Cottam in defendant's possession. Defendant never asserts his 
innocence, only that evidence was illegally obtained or that the 
State denied him a fair t r ia l . Furthermore, Jury Instruction No. 
23f admonished t h e j u r y not t o cons ide r , nor be inf luenced by any 
s t a t e m e n t s of counsel a s t o what the evidence i s un l e s s i t i s 
s t a t e d c o r r e c t l y , nor by any s ta tement of counsel of f a c t s not 
shown i n ev idence . The s t r e n g t h of t he evidence a g a i n s t 
de fendant , t o g e t h e r with t he above i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s s u s t a i n i n g of d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n t o the use of the word 
" fence" and admonit ion t o the prosecu tor not t o use t he word, 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e j u r y was not "probably in f luenced" by the 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s remarks . Therefore , a l though the prosecutor 
committed a minor e r r o r , i t does not war ran t r e v e r s a l of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
PERJURY CONVICTION. 
Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t because d e f e n d a n t ' s p rev ious 
c o n v i c t i o n for pe r ju ry was more than 10 years old and t h e t r i a l 
judge denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o suppress the p r i o r conv i c t i on , 
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the trial court failed to weigh the probative value against its 
prejudicial effect. This is an invalid assumption. In ruling to 
admit the prior perjury conviction, the court stated: 
I would think things older than ten 
years that involve things other than 
theft or attempted theft or a perjury 
would not be probative, generally 
speaking, and I would so rule. That's 
why I was so quick to agree with the 
aggravated assault or assault or 
whatever that charge was, but so far 
as perjury, the very nature of this 
matter today is going to be who do you 
believe, apparently, from what counsel 
told me. And so it goes to the very 
heart. If he testifies, they have a 
right to know what he has been con-
victed of previously, so I am going 
to rule that I will not limit it. 
(R. 272). 
The reasoning of the trial judge indicates that he did weigh the 
probative value against its possible prejudicial effect. The 
distinction between a prior conviction for perjury and any other 
prior conviction must be recognized, particularly in a case where 
it boils down to whether the jury believes the prosecution's 
witness or the defendant. 
This Court has held as a general rule tha t if the 
accused offers himself as a wi tness , he i s subject to being 
t r ea ted as any other wi tness , including cross-examination on any 
matter which would cast doubt upon the c r e d i b i l i t y of h is 
testimony. Sta te v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1981). 
Therefore, although the perjury conviction was more 
than 10 years old, the very nature of a perjury conviction sheds 
doubt upon defendant 's c r e d i b i l i t y . Because i t i s the sole 
province of the jury to judge the c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses, a 
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v i t a l f a c t such as a p r i o r pe r ju ry conv ic t ion i s necessary t o the 
j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Thus, t he t r i a l cour t p roper ly denied 
d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o suppress t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n . 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THEFT 
(CASE NO. 19990) f CURRENTLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT AND CONSOLIDATED WITH THIS CASE, 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE EVIDENCE WAS 
OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A VALID SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
Defendant c la ims t h a t i f t h i s Court r e v e r s e s 
d e f e n d a n t ' s conv i c t i on in t h i s case based on the i l l e g a l s e i z u r e 
of ev idence , then t h i s Court must a l s o r eve r se d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n for t h e f t (Case No. 19990). However, a s argued in Case 
No. 19990, defendant f a i l e d t o e n t e r a motion t o suppress evidence 
based on the execu t ion of an i l l e g a l search warran t before or 
du r ing t h e t r i a l of t h a t c a s e . (.£££ Respondent ' s Br ie f , Case No. 
19990, a t 4 ) . There fo re , even if t h i s Court r e v e r s e s d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n in t h e p re sen t ca se , a concurrent r e v e r s a l of Case No. 
19990 i s not wa r ran t ed . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on t h e fo rego ing , the t r i a l judge p roper ly denied 
d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o suppress evidence se ized pursuant t o the 
s ea rch war ran t and h i s motion t o suppress d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r 
pe r ju ry c o n v i c t i o n . There was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to suppor t t he 
j u r y ' s de t e rmina t i on t h a t t he value of the r i n g exceeded $1,000 
and the p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment dur ing c lo s ing argument does not 
war ran t r e v e r s a l . There fore , d e f e n d a n t ' s conv ic t i on should be 
a f f i rmed. 
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APPENDIX A 
F^S-MIOS 
id conversation between John GALUBGOS and Russell SLOWE on 12/15/65 At 1450 hours. 
JBQOS: How you do In* Mr. Slowe? Hey, I wanna show you something. If you got the tine. 
Aground noise - Slowe talks to another customer) 
LEGOS: I got it off of a burglary and I just wanna get rid of it. I don't give a...I 
't care how ouch you wanna give me for it. I gotta get rid of it. I got some other stuff 
but... 
WE: How much do you want for it? 
LEGOS: Anything you can give me for it. 
£ VOICE: How you doin* guy? 
.LEGOS: Hey man, what's happenin'? 
laudible) 
UEGOS: No. I'm supposed to meet Larry at two or something like that. We're gonna go 
t screwln' around. But I heard your son's back in town. A friend of mine said he saw 
a around. Uh, it's not that. It's a burglary but, you know, no, it's from, you know, 
ft or so, Roy. 
QUE: Huh? 
LLEGOS: Roy. I mean it's been a while, you know, but, you know... 
OWE: Uell, tell me what's the least you'll take for it. 
LLEGOS: Uell, give me a price. You know, I'm not too good on prices you know. Like this 
uff that I usually get, you know, I sell to relatives or something. They just give me 
price, you know? 
JOWE: Well, tell me what's the least you'll (inaudible) 
iLLBGOS: Fifty bucks. 
^OUE: Fifty, is that the best you'll do? 
MJLEGOS: Yea. 
LOWE: Go for forty? 
ALLEGOS: I'll go for forty. 
background noise) 
ALLEGOS: So how's business? 
(LOWE: Terrible. 
SALLEGOS: Terrible? **"* 
U* Y«. <*M_Z£2*Z 
Mn-jfe-SE^er 
'/I 
I: 83-38103 
BOOS: I was thinkin' Christinas time, you know. 
E: (Inaudible) 
2G0S: Oh. (pause) Thanks a lot. 
S: If you get fucked up (inaudible) 
3006: Oh, no way man. I keep it to myself, you know. Thanks a lot. 
-EGOS leaves). 
